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ABSTRACT
This article analyses the expansion of European Union cooperation
on aviation security using the framework of collective securitization.
It establishes how 9/11 was a precipitating event that put terrorism
and aviation security in the spotlight. 9/11 changed the collectively
held understanding of the security threat posed by terrorism
sufficiently to establish aviation security as a common policy
framework rather than a national issue. 9/11 was therefore used
by EU actors to convince the EU Member States that they all
faced one collective terrorist threat. The subsequent
institutionalization of this cooperation contributed to a
routinization of aviation practices in the EU. As a result of the
association between terrorism and aviation, 9/11 pushed EU
Member States into taking action on aviation security. This
caused the Member States to acknowledge the need for both the
highest possible standards of aviation security and the








This article is concerned with a particular aspect of the EU’s twenty-first century expan-
sion of its counter-terrorism remit. In the wake of the 11 September 2001 (9/11) attacks
the EU began involvement in aviation security, a highly technical subject of which it had
no experience. Given the globally inter-linked nature of aviation security, however, EU
aviation security has effects outside the borders of the Member States. This resulted in
the addition of a supranational dimension to part of the previously inter-governmental
system. This article analyses the expansion of European Union cooperation on aviation
security using the framework of collective securitization. It establishes how 9/11 was a
precipitating event that put terrorism and aviation security in the spotlight, and, in
addition, changed the collectively held understanding of the security threat posed by ter-
rorism sufficiently to establish aviation security as a common policy framework rather
than a national issue, as it was previously considered to be. 9/11 was therefore used by
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EU actors to convince the EU member states that they all faced one collective terrorist
threat, rather than each of them facing a distinctive threat.
Aviation was originally a matter for the individual state. However, towards the end of
the SecondWorld War, the great powers had begun to realize the importance and benefit
of international consensus on matters of regulation. Thus in 1944 the International Civil
Aviation Organisation (ICAO) was created. When aviation security became an issue at
the beginning of the 1970s this too came under the purview of ICAO. As aviation is
an international industry, it is developed and regulated at an international level. In con-
trast, it is controlled at a national level. The standards and practices developed by indus-
try bodies and trade organizations are implemented by the organs of national
governments. Aviation regulation has operated on this two-tier model since it began
with the birth of international organizations. The system remained so in to the
twenty-first century – regulations were set by the organs of the international community
such as ICAO, but were implemented and controlled by national governments. All
matters of aviation function around the clear and simple relationship between the indi-
vidual nation state and the various international organizations.
Aviation security upon its inception in the 1970s was no different. Prior to 9/11 this
also held true for the Member States of the EU. Aviation security was, as a matter of
sovereignty, a national competence – ICAO and the other international organizations
could recommend standards and practices but had no power to enforce implementation.
This was the prerogative of the individual state. In the post-9/11 era, however, the situ-
ation changed – the EU saw integration in aviation security occur with the European
Commission obtaining a new competence over aviation security. The growth of aviation
has significantly expanded the scope of duties and issues covered by international organ-
izations. It is to be noted that this article is only interested in civil aviation security rather
than the security of military aviation, and commercial rather than general aviation. As
such, when the article mentions aviation security it should be assumed to mean commer-
cial aviation security.
Collective securitization, aviation security and terrorism
For years, several European countries, including Spain, Italy, the United Kingdom and
West Germany, tackled the terrorist threat each of them was facing largely on their
own. The general perception was that each state was faced with a distinct threat,
namely ETA (“Basque Fatherland and Liberty”) in Spain, the Red Brigades in Italy, the
Irish Republican Army in the UK, and the Red Army Faction in Germany. Cooperation
amongst European states remained extremely limited. Some European governments even
accused others of actually enabling the growth of terrorism. Thus, compared to the lack
of shared perception of the terrorist threat and the virtual absence of counter-terrorism
cooperation amongst European states in the 1970s and 1980s, the existence of EU-wide
debates, legislative instruments and practical cooperation nowadays is particularly
remarkable. This section explores this change and seeks to explain it by drawing upon
the concept of “collective securitization”.
The concept of “securitization” was initially developed by Ole Wæver to make a major
contribution to the so-called “widening-deepening” debate in security studies, which had
begun in the 1980s and intensified with the end of the Cold War. The “widening”
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dimension was defined as the extension of security to issues or sectors other than the
military, such as the environment or the economy, whereas the “deepening” dimension
addressed the question of whether entities other than the state, such as society or indi-
vidual human beings, should be able to claim security threats (Krause & Williams,
1996, p. 230). Together with the concept of “security sectors” previously developed by
Buzan (1991), “securitization” is at the heart of a new theoretical framework that, accord-
ing to Wæver and Buzan, enables researchers to simultaneously widen and deepen the
concept of security without rendering it too broad or meaningless. The key idea under-
pinning the securitization framework is that security is not about objective threats that
“really” exist out there. Rather, still for Wæver and Buzan, it is about “the processes of
constructing a shared understanding of what is to be considered and collectively
responded to as a threat” (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998, p. 26). More precisely,
[security] is about survival. It is when an issue is presented as posing an existential threat to a
designated referent object (traditionally, but not necessarily, the state, incorporating govern-
ment, territory, and society). The special nature of security threats justifies the use of extra-
ordinary measures to handle them. (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 21)
In other words, according to Buzan and Wæver (also known as the “Copenhagen
School”), security is a “speech act” (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 26) (see also Balzacq, 2005,
pp. 174–179; Roe, 2008, p. 617; Stritzel, 2007, p. 358; Wæver, 1995, pp. 54–55). It is an
intersubjective and socially constructed phenomenon. Key concepts in the securitization
framework are the “securitizing actor”, who socially constructs a specific issue as a threat
to the survival of a given entity, known as the “referent object”, which therefore requires
urgent protection through the use of extraordinary measures. Another important
concept is that of the “audience”. According to the Copenhagen School,
[a] discourse that takes the form of presenting something as an existential threat to a referent
object does not by itself create securitization – this is a securitizing move, but the issue is
securitized only if and when the audience accepts it as such. (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 25)
To sum up, securitization is understood as a process whereby a given actor frames a
specific issue as an “existential threat”, which is then presented to a target audience for
approval in order to employ extraordinary means and measures to tackle it (Léonard
& Kaunert, 2010, p. 57).
In its original formulation by the Copenhagen School and in subsequent studies by
other scholars, securitization theory has overwhelmingly been applied to states, as well
as nations to a lesser extent. According to Buzan and Wæver (2009, p. 255),
the middle-scale “limited collectivities” have proved the most amenable to securitisation as
durable referent objects [because] such limited collectivities (states, nations, and as antici-
pated by Huntington, civilisations) engage in self-reinforcing rivalries with other limited
collectivities and that such interaction strengthens their we-feeling.
This in turn facilitates securitization. In contrast, collectivities at the system level lack the
mass identity that is necessary for securitization to take place (Buzan & Wæver, 2009,
p. 255). In other words, the level of analysis in the study of securitization processes
has generally been the middle level of world politics, with a specific focus on states.
This is not to say that the work of the Copenhagen School has exclusively focused on
states. This can notably be illustrated by their other concept of “security constellation”,
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which “[links] across all of the levels and sectors in which securitisations occur”, and that
of “macrosecuritisation”, which concerns “referent objects higher than those at the
middle level” and “[aims] to incorporate and coordinate multiple lower level securitisa-
tions” (Buzan &Wæver, 2009, p. 257), as seen during the Cold War. In addition, some of
Wæver and Buzan’s writings also went beyond the national level to focus on regions, in
particular their development of Regional Security Complex Theory. This was under-
pinned by the concept of “regional security complex”, which they defined as “a set of
units whose major processes of securitization and de-securitization or both are so inter-
linked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from
one another” (Buzan & Wæver, 2003; Buzan et al., 1998, p. 201).
However, what is striking is that, even when Buzan and Wæver considered regions or
the level above that of world politics, their work remained firmly focused on states, their
patterns of amity and enmity, as well as the distribution of power amongst them and the
role of global powers (Buzan &Wæver, 2003, 2009; Buzan et al., 1998). In particular, they
did not consider how securitization processes may take place within regional arrange-
ments. The first scholars to address this gap in the literature were Haacke and Williams
(2008). They coined the concept of “collective securitization”, which they defined as
securitization within a regional arrangement as involving one or more securitizing actors
within that arrangement identifying a particular development or issue as an existential
threat to a security referent, making relevant validity claims, and finding a receptive audi-
ence among other regional actors. (Haacke & Williams, 2008, p. 785)
They also noted that one could expect securitizing moves within a regional arrangement
to entail claims that a specific development “constituted a threat either to regional security
or to the respective national security of participants, and required a collective response”
(Haacke & Williams, 2008, p. 785). Nevertheless, as highlighted by Sperling and Webber
(2016, p. 29), Haacke and Williams’s approach “[assumed] that a state [would] initiate a
securitising move that [would] then be generalised within a regional arrangement or
organisation”. They did not consider cases where a regional organization itself could
initiate a securitizing move. This is to a significant extent linked to their case selection,
as they focused on the cases of the African Union (AU) and the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN). Those may indeed be considered “the primary multilateral
arrangements in their respective region” (Haacke & Williams, 2008, p. 777). However,
compared to a regional organization like the EU, the AU and ASEAN are characterized
by a considerably lower degree of integration when it comes to the institutional set-up,
the decision-making processes, the degree of legal integration, and the extent of political
integration, amongst others. In contrast, Sperling andWebber have argued that the role of
regional security organizations should not necessarily be reduced to that of a site for bar-
gaining amongst their Member States. In their view, a regional security organization can
also be an agent of collective securitization, especially “when an international organis-
ation is possessed of legal and political authority, has agenda-setting powers, is the frame-
work for formulating and implementing common policies, and is the repository of a
common security narrative” (Sperling & Webber, 2016, p. 29).
In order to study this process of collective securitization, Sperling and Webber (2019)
have outlined a six-stage model, which comprises (1) the status quo security discourse
and policies; (2) a single precipitating event or a cascade of events; (3) the securitizing
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move; (4) the response of the audience; (5) the formulation and execution of policies to
address the securitized threat; and (6) routinization and the emergence of a new status
quo. As emphasized by Sperling and Webber, although it might be analytically possible
to distinguish the securitizing move from the audience response, the two stages “are co-
dependent through the process of recursive interaction”.
In this article, we are particularly interested in the links and associations between avia-
tion, safety, security and terrorism. 9/11 highlighted the threat terrorism poses to the
safety and security of aviation. This argument is not however new. Rather, it is one
that has been put forward by scholars including the leading voices on the subject,
prior to 9/11. Whilst the field of scholarly attention on aviation security was limited,
mainly due to its origins and subsequent evolution as an area of expertise within the avia-
tion industry, those involved have written repeatedly on the association between aviation
and terrorism since the 1970s. This includes leading academics in terrorism studies such
as: Bruce Hoffman1; Brian Jenkins2; Ariel Merari3 and PaulWilkinson4 as well as political
scientists such as Peter St John. The functional links between terrorism and aviation
security are not only addressed in the literature prior to 9/11 by academics but also by
practitioners, such as Rodney Wallis.5
The literature on aviation security has – similarly to the discourse, practices and policy
outputs as this article will subsequently examine – often resulted from specific precipitat-
ing events such as: the 1968 attack on an El Al flight by the Popular Front for the Liber-
ation of Palestine (PFLP) and subsequent political extortion of using the plane and
passengers to demand the release of imprisoned Arabs, the bombing of the Kanishka –
Air India Flight 182 from Toronto to New Delhi via London over the Atlantic Ocean
in June 1985, or the bombing of The Maid of the Seas – Pan America World Airways
(Pan Am) Flight 103 from London to New York over Lockerbie, Scotland in December
1988. With each take-over or bombing of a flight, or attack on an airport the threat to
civil aviation from terrorism was further demonstrated. 9/11 brought the functional
links between terrorism and aviation to the forefront of public consciousness, which
magnified scholarly focus on aviation security. This has been further re-enforced by
more recent examples such as: the failed “shoe bomb” attack in December 2001; the
shooting of the El Al check-in desk at Los Angeles Airport in July 2002; the foiled
liquids plot of 2006; the 2007 suicide vehicle bomb attack on Glasgow Airport; the
failed “underwear bomb” attempt of Christmas Day 2009; and the foiled 2010 Toner Car-
tridge bomb plot (Argomaniz & Lehr, 2016; Barros, 2012; Sweet, 2004).
Thus, while a link between aviation and terrorism can be established empirically, the
way this association is constructed linguistically and through practices remains at the
heart of whether aviation does or not become securitized in the EU. While terrorism
had long been viewed as a national security threat in several European countries, it
was only after 9/11 that it was socially constructed as a collective security threat in –
and to – the EU (Kaunert & Léonard, 2019). This article will examine the constructed
links between this collective securitization, the practices and associations with terrorism,
and aviation and safety regulation in the EU. The collective securitization of aviation
through association with terrorism provided the impetus for supranational governance
in aviation security. In addition to a major exogenous shock like 9/11, the EU saw
very significant instances of policy entrepreneurship, most notably by the European
Commission, as well as the Council Secretariat. As argued by Kaunert (2010c), EU
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institutional actors have played a crucial role in shaping the development of the AFSJ in
particular ways. The European Commission and its ally the Council Secretariat have
acted in an alliance of supranational policy entrepreneurs in the area of counter-terror-
ism, as evidenced notably by the cases of the European Arrest Warrant (Kaunert, 2007).
Member states have often been pushing towards dealing with these new security threats,
which have traditionally called for national solutions. European institutions, in particular
the European Commission, have managed to channel this process towards developing a
“European” – rather than a “national” – solution. As a result, supranational governance
has been increased in the AFSJ.
Aviation security prior to EU involvement – perceived as only a safety
issue
International aviation was considered highly important by the major air powers during
the Second World War and the need for international cooperation in civil aviation was
recognized by all involved in it. This led to the International Civil Aviation Organis-
ation’s (ICAO) beginnings as a group of Second World War allies who saw an inter-
national body as being beneficial to the development of international air transport and
its safety (MacKenzie, 2010). With the passing of the Convention on Civil Aviation
otherwise known as the Chicago Convention on 7 December 1944, ICAO was
officially created. ICAO, which is a specialized agency of the UN, was established with
the mandate “to ensure the safe, efficient and orderly evolution of international civil avia-
tion” (ICAO, n.d.a.). ICAO’s initial remit centred on the issues discussed at the Inter-
national Aviation Conference in Chicago. These can generally be split into the
following categories: world route arrangements, the creation of the organization, and a
multilateral aviation convention – concerned with air navigation, air transport, and tech-
nical aviation matters – or safety (MacKenzie, 2010). The Chicago Convention did not
cover any form of unlawful interference however as “no one foresaw such threats and
the need to address them” (ICAO, n.d.b). Another extremely prominent international
organization involved in aviation is the International Air Transport Association
(IATA), the trade association of the world’s scheduled airlines. IATA was established
with specific goals – one of which was “to promote safe, regular and economical air trans-
port for the benefit of the peoples of the world” (Wallis, 1999, p. 162). Both ICAO and
IATA were predominantly focused on aviation safety. As aviation is an international
industry, it is developed and regulated at an international level. In contrast it is controlled
at a national level. The standards and practices developed through the established dis-
course built on cooperation and consensus by industry bodies and trade organizations
are legislated and implemented by the organs of national governments. Aviation regu-
lation has operated on this two-tier model since it began with the birth of international
organizations. The system remained so in to the twenty-first century – regulations were
set by the organs of the international community such as ICAO but were implemented
and controlled by national governments. All matters of aviation function around the
clear and simple relationship between the individual nation state and the various inter-
national organizations. Aviation security upon its inception was no different.
Aviation has been a target of terrorism since the early days of commercial aviation
which was in its first incarnation concerned with the hijacking of aircraft. The earliest
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recorded instance dates back to 1930 when Peruvian revolutionaries attempted to hijack
a mail plane to distribute propaganda leaflets (Wallis, 1993). In 1947, the first fatal hijack-
ing occurred. 1948 saw not only the first hijacking for criminal rather than political pur-
poses but also the first aircraft to crash due to air piracy. In 1950 the first multiple hijack
occurred (St John, 1991). Despite this no action was taken by either the aviation industry
or governments to counteract hijacking. The political change in Cuba which occurred
when Fidel Castro became President caused an unparalleled surge in hijacking. Rather
than the creation of aviation security occurring in response to any single precipitating
event this escalation in hijacking acted as a cascade of events resulting in governments
and international bodies beginning to act. In 1963 an ICAO treaty on hijacking, the
Tokyo Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft,
was signed although it was not ratified until 1969. The Tokyo Convention, however,
dealt only with the expedient return of hijacked aircraft and passengers (Arey, 1973; St
John, 1991; Sweet, 2004). 1968 saw the first hijack for political extortion. In the same
year, the first instance of non-hijacking aviation terrorism occurred – an armed attack
against aircraft on the ground (Merari, 1999). 1970 saw the first attack against aviation
related property other than aircraft or airports: that of the headquarters building of an
airline (Phillips, 1973). Also in 1970, in an unprecedented move, the PFLP committed
a multiple hijack which at the time was considered “the most remarkable event in the
history of aerial piracy” (Phillips, 1973, p. 140). The 1970s was not only a significant evol-
utionary period for the threat itself but also for measures to counter the threat terrorism
posed to the safety of aviation. The security discourse that had begun among ICAO’s
membership and resulted in the Tokyo Convention and the continuing view of terrorism
as a threat to aviation resulted in furthered cooperation. In 1970 ICAO passed the Hague
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft declaring hijacking to be
a criminal offense that was extraditable. The Montreal Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving Civil Aviation of 1971 declared the same as
the Hague Convention for any action that endangers the safety of persons at airports. The
Montreal Convention also covered attacks against aircraft both in flight and on the
ground (Hill, 1989). One of the most important actions during this period was the
official creation of aviation security. This occurred when the Chicago Convention was
formally amended in 1974 to incorporate the newly created “Annex 17 – Security”.
ICAO considers aviation security to be concerned with preventing
acts of violence directed against international civil air transport and airports and other facili-
ties used by such air transport [which] jeopardize the safety thereof, seriously affect the oper-
ation of international air services and undermine the confidence of the peoples of the world
in the safety of international civil air transport. (2009, p. 199)
These acts of violence “may be directed against aircraft, aircraft crews and passengers
engaged in international air transport” or “against civil aviation personnel, civil airports
and other facilities used by international civil air transport” (ICAO, 2009, p. 199). This is
usually referred to as the safeguarding of international civil aviation against acts of
unlawful interference where unlawful interference can be explained as “acts of sabotage,
unlawful seizure of aircraft and the use of civil aircraft in terrorist attacks” (IATA, 2010).
Discourse and resulting measures to protect the safety of aviation from the threat of ter-
rorism were not confined solely to ICAO and IATA. The International Federation of
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Airline Pilots Associations (IFALPA) also became involved in trying to curtail hijacking,
by refusing to fly to airports in countries that were perceived to allow or condone aerial
piracy. In 1978 the Bonn Summit, a meeting of government leaders from the seven
Western industrial powers – the UK, the US, Canada, Germany, Japan, France and
Italy – took place (St John, 1999; Wallis, 1999). This gave rise to the Bonn Declaration
in which all countries present “agreed to impose sanctions against any state that sup-
ported or cooperated in the hijacking of aircraft” (ICAO, 2009). The introduction of
security measures did not however cause hijacking to cease. There were three hundred
hijacks between 1977 and 1986, and two hundred and twelve between 1987 and 1996
(Merari, 1999). Furthermore, the 1980s saw an increasing number of fatalities caused
by hijacking.
From the 1970s onwards aviation terrorism appeared to take a new direction with
sabotage becoming more prominent than hijacking. Between 1969 and 1999 there
were more than seventy known attempts to sabotage aircraft in-flight with explosives
(Jenkins, 1999). One act of sabotage that had the biggest impact on aviation security
was the loss of Air India’s Kanishka in 1985. An improvised explosive device (IED)
blew the aircraft up resulting in three hundred and twenty-nine deaths, which was the
largest loss of life to occur as the result of a single incident to date and remained so
until 9/11 (Jenkins, 1999; Wallis, 1993). The result was the incorporation into ICAO’s
Annex 17 of an IATA developed security standard: that of full passenger and baggage
reconciliation becoming mandatory (Jenkins, 1999; Sweet, 2004). This is regarded as
the most significant change in international aviation security standards in the 1980s.
In 1986, a TWA flight suffered an explosion that ruptured the aircraft killing one passen-
ger instantly and causing three to fall to their deaths (Wallis, 2001). Subsequent investi-
gation found the IED was planted by a passenger who deplaned at a transit stop, where
the aircraft had been searched sufficiently to meet industry requirements. As a result of
this, IATA recommended all airlines should include the lifting of seat cushions during
searches at transit stops (Wallis, 2001). In 1987, a Korean Air flight crashed killing
one hundred and fifteen. This was the result of an IED smuggled on board in hand
luggage by passengers who deplaned at a transit stop (Wallis, 1993). The outcome
was an instruction from the Council of ICAO to its Committee on Unlawful Interference to
advise on changes needed to security procedures to control the movement of transit (by
which they also mean transfer) passengers and for the detection of explosive substances.
(Wallis, 1993, p. 19)
It is clear from the TWA and Korean Air incidents that new security measures came in
response to terror attacks that previously occurred rather than from considering possible
future threats. It is also evident that the reactions lacked the necessary strength. Instead of
recommendations and instructions to advise, new mandatory procedures should have
been developed. In 1988, Pan Am aircraft The Maid of the Seas designated Flight 103,
exploded over the Scottish town of Lockerbie causing the deaths of all two hundred
and fifty-nine on board, and eleven residents of the town. The Scottish Fatal Accident
Inquiry found that the aircraft was destroyed by an IED hidden in an unaccompanied
bag. One of the most jarring aspects of the Lockerbie tragedy was that those responsible
used the same method as the perpetrators of the Kanishka bombing (Wallis, 2001; Wilk-
inson, 1999). With no major incidents occurring since the beginning of the 1990s, and
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with security procedures becoming so developed, complacency settled in. This is another
reason why the industry was so woefully unprepared for 9/11. Having never been proac-
tive, and without any new stimulus for reaction, anticipation of an evolved future threat
was at an all-time low. Furthermore, despite the prevalence of terrorist acts of unlawful
interference, aviation security as it had been developed by the international organizations
was still considered to be a safety issue. As such it was primarily a matter for the individ-
ual sovereign states that make up ICAO’s contracting membership.
Collective securitization of aviation
Given the cross-border nature of aviation, what happens in one country can have both
indirect and direct effects on other countries. If security is lacking in one country, it
puts the security of other countries’ aviation systems at risk. This was ably demonstrated
by numerous incidences of hijacking and sabotage during the 1970s and 1980s. Terror-
ism directed at aviation is perceived to pose a threat at the global level. Thus, ever since its
inception aviation security has been a common interest. Most of ICAO’s work on avia-
tion security has as such been concerned with Standards and Recommended Practices
(SaRPs). ICAO relies on Contracting States adhering to SaRPs as it had no legislative
power. In addition, the list of Contracting States spans the entire global scale in terms
of both wealth and technological capability. It is therefore required to balance setting
SaRPs at the lowest common denominator to ensure all Contracting States are capable
of adhering and yet ensure this minimum provides an adequate level to achieve the desig-
nated aim. Many countries choose to implement their own programmes over and above
ICAO’s SaRPs in order to ensure that their own national aviation programmes are as
strong as possible, especially in the area of security. It has therefore long since been
the view of ICAO and the other international organizations that in order to ensure an
adequate level of security in any given country, all countries must adhere to a certain
standard. Without common basic standards there is no security. Even with the most
stringent national aviation security programme, there is a significant risk if other
states do not enact even the most basic requirements to ensure the security of aviation
originating within their borders.
Prior to 9/11, the EU had no active involvement in aviation security, as it was con-
sidered by all to be a national competence. The EU merely followed European aviation
security with it holding observer status at the European Civil Aviation Conference
(ECAC) – the regional forum of European national Directors of Civil Aviation. As
such, EU involvement in aviation security prior to 9/11 was limited to an awareness of
both the issue itself and what the Member States were doing regarding it. Aviation secur-
ity as a political competence was only developed in 2001 because of the precipitating
event that was 9/11. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, all Western governments not
just the Member States of the EU were concerned with the protection of citizens and criti-
cal infrastructure within their borders. This required the strengthening of counter-terror-
ism capabilities to the fullest extent possible. The shock of the attacks was a wake-up call,
and in the aftermath security issues became a critical point in politics. The immediate
effect of 9/11 was a feeling amongst EU policymakers of needing to react to the situation.
It was perceived that the reaction needed to be the swift and effective integration of secur-
ity policy. One of the many significant effects of 9/11 was the collective securitization of
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terrorism in the EU (Kaunert & Léonard, 2019). Whilst it may seem obvious that this was
also the case with regard to aviation especially given the specific nature of the 9/11
attacks, without an exogenous shock of such magnitude there would not have been a suit-
able policy window for a policy entrepreneur to exploit.
Aviation security policy has been subject to much criticism over the years. Whilst avia-
tion security by its very nature must be to a degree reactive, a prominent criticism is that
national aviation policy is simply reactive, in that it focuses only on attempting to ensure
protection against repeats of previous attacks. Furthermore, it is argued that: “Like all
policy inspired by [precipitating] events … the window of opportunity … for policy
change in aviation disasters is rather short after a large, attention-grabbing event” (Birk-
land, 2004, p. 342). Before 9/11, all Member States were happy with non-binding regu-
lations at the EU level. Even the established security discourse and resulting policies
and practices of the international organizations such as ICAO centred on the consensus
and cooperation among states. The issue was considered one of national sovereignty.
Moreover, the creation of a tertiary level through a supranational framework for aviation
security would have been unthinkable. However, after the attacks the existing status quo
was dramatically altered. There was the perceived need to strengthen the rules – harmo-
nization through regulation – otherwise it would have been the same as it was prior to 9/
11, which now was deemed not good enough. It was also felt that aviation security was a
matter of the utmost priority. Not only did something need to be done, but it needed to
be done quickly. At an emergency session of the Council on 14 September 2001, con-
vened as a direct result of 9/11, the Ministers of Transport decided the EU needed
common binding rules. The shock factor of 9/11, both in its apparent suddenness and
its overwhelming magnitude, and the fear regarding the cost – both human and econ-
omical – of another such attack undoubtedly influenced the opinions of the Member
States.
By recognizing the policy window that had opened in the wake of 9/11 and responding
by pushing for its involvement, the Commission demonstrated its ability to perform the
role of a supranational policy entrepreneur. Policy windows even when utilized fully by
bona fide policy entrepreneurs do not translate directly into legislation. The Council had
simply decided that aviation security as an issue should be given attention at the Com-
munity level. This could have taken a variety of forms up to and including the achieve-
ment of a legislative competence. In fact, in many other policy areas which are related to
aviation security, for example many areas of aviation, involvement at the EU level is more
along the lines of communicative cooperation than legislative action. The securitizing
move in response to 9/11 and exploitation of the subsequent policy window which
resulted in the EU beginning to legislate aviation security was shown to be successful
through the acceptance of the Member States. This not only demonstrates the ability
and strength of the Commission acting as a supranational policy entrepreneur but also
the Commission’s role as a securitizing actor.
Policy output and routinization
There was a perceived need for the Commission to act with a sense of urgency, to show
that the EU could integrate security policy quickly and efficiently. Whilst in the immedi-
ate aftermath of 9/11 the national governments of Member States welcomed the EU
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involvement, the EU recognized that as aviation security had previously been a national
competence it was one in which they had no experience. As such, Regulation (EC) No
2320/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2002 estab-
lishing common rules in the field of civil aviation security, which was the EU’s first leg-
islative effort as part of the new competence, simply translated the recommendations of
ECAC’s Doc 30 into EU Law. By doing so the Commission made the formerly optional
common standards mandatory. Due to the generally more affluent nature of ECAC’s
overall Membership to that of ICAO, it is able to set higher common standards than
ICAO on account of the lowest common denominator having to take into account the
poorest and least developed of the Contracting States. The rapidity with which the EU
moved into aviation security suggests that the focus was on the occurrence of action
rather than the substance of it. The self-proclaimed justification for Regulation (EC)
No 2320/2002 was the need of the EU to ensure the safety of Europeans within its
borders – by protecting civil aviation from acts of unlawful interference. In essence, to
ensure another 9/11 could not happen in Europe. As the EU was aware that the
Member States were, however, already doing this, the policy the EU produced was not
the creation of new procedures for aviation security, but rather the legislating of that
which was already in place. This, therefore, suggests the post-9/11 securitization of avia-
tion was primarily a symbolic show of strength. Given the magnitude and nature of the
threat, the EU needed to move quickly to appear strong and in control. The easiest and
most effective way was to render the voluntarily maintained status quo mandatory. This
was undoubtedly aided by the designating the referent object as “the very essence of the
European Union” to which “terrorism is one of the greatest threats” (OJ L 355, 2002,
p. 1). The added advantage of this was not only that it came replete with an established
discourse but guaranteed an accepting audience response.
In addition to being expeditious and simple, using the current industry recommen-
dations rather than attempting to develop new common basic standards was rational.
By using the knowledge of others as the base on which to develop its efforts, the EU
was able to ensure the securitizing move was accepted by the audience but also success-
fully generate policy output and thus fulfil the stated aim of establishing EU common
basic standards on aviation security. This was achieved with the passing of Regulation
(EC) No 2320/2002. Regulation (EC) No 2320/2002 passed legislative control of aviation
security from the national level to the Community level. It did not however negate the
role of the Member State. Given the EU’s standing in aviation security in December
2002, it was dependent on the Member States for their equipment, personnel and to rep-
resent it as an actor in the established international system. Whilst the securitization of
aviation in the EU established a security discourse and resulting policy outputs at the
Community level it did not create a tertiary level in the wider aviation industry. Inter-
national aviation still functions on the same two-tier regulatory structure between the
sovereign states and the international organizations of which they are constituent
members. Recursive interaction was thus a significant aspect of the collective securitiza-
tion of aviation in the EU. The Member States as the audience were not simply the reci-
pient subjects of a securitizing move, but also empowered it.
Upon review, the content of the Annex – ECAC’s Doc 30, contains more specific stan-
dards than general levels. When these are rewritten from recommendations into require-
ments problems can occur upon implementation. Regulation (EC) No 2320/2002 was
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fraught with problems resulting from it being drafted too quickly by those without the
appropriate experience. The non-binding recommendations contained within ECAC’s
Doc 30 did not work as legislation and, therefore, implementation was severely proble-
matic. The subject of implementation was addressed with the passing of Regulation (EC)
No 622/2003 of 4 April 2003 laying down measures for the implementation of the
common basic standards on aviation security. The purpose of Regulation (EC) No
622/2003 is to provide “the necessary measures for the implementation and technical
adaption of common basic standards regarding aviation security”. This new legislation,
which was drafted and passed to amend the initial policy output, evidenced the spill-
over from legislating standards to legislating implementation measures – or from
policy to practice. With the new legislation, the EU began legislating the exact
measures through which the common basic standards should be implemented. This
presented a catch-22 situation: dealing in specifics requires experience – which the
EU did not have, by legislating specifics the EU reduced the autonomy afforded to
Member States – who did have the necessary experience. This is proven true by the
failings of Regulation (EC) No 622/2003 as can be seen from the number of times it
was necessary to amend it and the reasons for this. Only one amendment was a
direct response to threat development, namely the introduction of measures concern-
ing Liquids, Aerosols and Gels in response to the foiled liquids plot of 2006. This orig-
inal legislative response to the new threat clearly demonstrates the increased actorness
during the initial involvement. Rather than merely being a repository for a common
security narrative and aggregating the security practices of its Member States, the Com-
mission was now able to lead that narrative and respond to precipitating events with
successful securitizations. The rest of the amendments, thirteen in a four-year
period, were all concerned with correcting the shortcomings of the previous policies.
The revisions to Regulation (EC) No 622/2003 did, however, make a positive contri-
bution to EU aviation security: they demonstrated the strength of the EU’s experience
as an actor in counter-terrorism and how this was used to inform aviation security
policy.
EU initial efforts highlighted both the importance of successful implementation and
the gap between policy and practice. As such, it was necessary for the EU to learn the
lessons of its mistakes and redraft its aviation security policy. This led to increased sub-
stantive exchanges between the EU and Member States. Therefore Regulation (EC) No
300/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2008 on
common rules in the field of civil aviation security and repealing Regulation (EC) No
2320/2002 was passed. As Regulation (EC) No 622/2003 pertained to Regulation (EC)
2320/2002 it too was repealed and was replaced with Commission Regulation (EC) No
820/2008 of 8 August 2008 laying down measures for the implementation of the
common basic standards on aviation security. Regulation (EC) No 820/2008 was
however concerned with measures to facilitate the implementation of Regulation (EC)
No 300/2008 rather than proscribing exactly how this was to be done. One of the key
lessons learnt by the EU because of Regulation (EC) No 2320/2002 is the kinetic,
almost fluid, nature of aviation security. Specifically, how it is wide ranging and ever
changing, as well as its dependence on technologies that are continually expanding
and developing. This is evidenced by the statement in Regulation (EC) No 300/2008
that EU aviation security policy needs to be more flexible. As such it
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should lay down the basic principles of what has to be done in order to safeguard civil avia-
tion against acts of unlawful interference without going into technical and procedural details
of how they are to be implemented. (OJ L 97, 2008, p. 72)
This is a far cry from the attitude originally adopted under Regulation (EC) No 2320/
2002 and furthered by Regulation (EC) 622/2003 and its many amendments. Recursive
interaction became a much more prominent feature in the routinization of aviation
security and can be evidenced in the increasing implementability and coverage of succes-
sive policies. This supports Sperling & Webber’s assertion that exception and routine are
not mutually exclusive in all securitizations. Whilst it was the precipitating event of 9/11
that initiated the securitization of aviation, the subsequent development of it was deter-
mined by both further precipitating events but also prior experience and practices which
in turn shaped the routinization and new status quo.
Whilst Regulation (EC) No 300/2008 stated the EU would not dictate to Member
States how they should go about implementing the common rules and common basic
standards it contains, it did, however, state that the EU would inspect whether or not
these rules and standards were in fact implemented. A historical weakness of aviation
security is that the international organizations are unable to ensure the necessary stan-
dards due to lacking the power to enforce implementation at the national level. Whilst
ICAO has always been the preeminent body for setting standards, it was unable to
enforce them, and was not involved in compliance monitoring prior to 9/11. Whilst
common basic standards are by their very nature the necessary measures, wherever
they have existed so has the right to derogate from them – the allowance to go over
and above. This is not simply to prevent the infringement of sovereignty. This is also
due to the necessity for security measures to vary in accordance with the differing
nature of the threat which tends to be specific to a particular locale. By including
common basic standards in legislation with which the Member States are required to
comply, the EU thus theoretically countered this weakness. The reality is, however,
that no legislation is self-implementing. In order to achieve a common basic standard,
the EU had to ensure that implementation occurred. Regulation (EC) 2320/2002 con-
tained the requirement that Member States develop and implement a National Quality
Control Programme. Further legislation was subsequently passed which was designed
to ensure harmonization of NQCPs across Member States in order to allow for successful
monitoring at the EU level. The monitoring of compliance through inspections of the
implementation of the legislated common basic standards has been a significant focus
of EU efforts. Through this vertical spill-over from the EU’s involvement in creating avia-
tion security policy to the strong focus on compliance monitoring, the EU ensured the
implementation of its common basic standards. This is something which its antecedents
have always been unable to do, thus countering one of the biggest obstacles to successful
international regulation of aviation security. As such, the EU has proven its strength and
relevance as an aviation security actor.
Conclusion
This article has focused on a particular aspect of the expansion of the EU’s counter-ter-
rorism activities, namely aviation security. Prior to 9/11, aviation security operated on a
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two-tier structure. SaRPs were set by the international organizations of the industry and
were implemented by the national governments. In the wake of the focusing event that
was 9/11 the EU begun involvement in aviation security, adding a supranational dimen-
sion to the previously inter-governmental system, through the collective securitization of
terrorism in the EU (Kaunert & Léonard, 2019). Given the globally inter-linked nature of
aviation security, however, the effects of EU involvement were not constrained to avia-
tion security within its Member States.
The purpose of the article was to analyse EU involvement in aviation security.
Given the wide field this article is located within, the article has made an original con-
tribution to numerous areas of the existing scholarly literature. First, it has significantly
widened the scope of the field of literature concerned with aviation security. Previously
this field tended to have a three-fold focus. First, the practical and technical aspects of
aviation security. Second, aviation security in individual countries – most often the
USA. Third, the history of aviation security – the threat it faces and the response of
the international organizations involved in it. First, this article, by considering the
development of aviation security in the EU, has not only added to these existing
areas individually but also in conjunction with one another. Furthermore, it has not
only identified a gap in the existing literature, but has also addressed it. Second,
this article expands and builds upon the field of EU counter-terrorism through the
consideration of the EU’s involvement in aviation security. The article has contributed
to those works that consider the issue of both the effect of 9/11 on the political remit
of the EU and the subject matter of this expanded remit. Third, the article has also
made a contribution to the field of EU policy entrepreneurship (Kaunert, 2007,
2010a, 2010b, 2010c) through its consideration of the role of the Commission in
driving integration in this area.
This article has demonstrated that aviation security both by way of its very creation
and also continually through its subsequent evolution, is reactive in nature. This has
been explained by the fact that in the absence of unequivocal provocation resulting
from public opinion in the aftermath of fatal attacks, the industry has historically had
a tendency to favour profit and thus increased national revenue over costly security
measures. The evolution of aviation security has been guided and regulated by inter-
national organizations which are constrained by having to set standards at the LCD as
a result of the sheer diversity, both economically and technically, of their Member
States. These organizations have an additional inherent weakness, which is that they
lack the power of enforcement and have to rely on the national organs of the individual
states to ensure implementation. When combined these factors can potentially have a sig-
nificant negative impact on the level of aviation security. This fact was exploited by the
perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks, demonstrating not only the need for high standards of
aviation security but also its global nature and thus the magnitude of the consequences of
these standards not being met.
It has been shown that the 9/11 attacks were the main reason for the instigation of the
EU’s efforts in aviation security. Furthermore, this occurred at the behest of the Member
States, all of whom were in agreement that EU involvement was now necessary. However,
as the EU previously had no experience in aviation security, the decision was to follow in
the footsteps of those who did with the aim of building on this. This article has shown this
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aim to be establishing the harmonization of aviation security across the EU through the
creation of EU common basic standards.
Notes
1. Hoffman was a Founding Director of the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political
Violence at the University of St. Andrews (along with Paul Wilkinson) and was appointed
as a Commissioner to The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United
States (the 9/11 Commission). He succeeded Brian Jenkins at RAND (Council on Foreign
Relations, n.d.; Committee on Homeland Security, 2010; Wilkinson & Jenkins, 1999).
2. A terrorism and counter-insurgency expert who has been lauded as one of the first and fore-
most leaders in academic research on terrorism, who started the RAND terrorism research
programme in 1972, and was appointed to theWhite House Commission on Aviation Safety
and Security in 1996 as well as serving as an advisor to the National Commission on Terror-
ism from 1999 to 2000 (RAND Corporation, n.d.; Wilkinson & Jenkins, 1999).
3. In addition to academic work on political terrorism including establishing the Tel Aviv Uni-
versity’s Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies’ Terrorism and Low intensity Conflict Program,
Merari also established and commanded Israel’s Hostage Negotiations and Crisis Manage-
ment Unit (International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, n.d.; Wilkinson & Jenkins, 1999).
4. Wilkinson remains to date the most prominent academic on aviation security. In addition to
numerous published works on terrorism and democracy from 1974, he was a guest lecturer
and frequent expert consultant and advisory. Wilkinson began to focus on aviation after
Lockerbie not only authoring numerous highly respected works but also advising both
the UK Department for Transport and the US Federal Aviation Administration, many
other governments, as well as both NATO and the United Nations (Rengger, 2011;
Wallis, 1993, 2003).
5. A former Director of Security for the International Air Transport Association and has
served on the International Civil Aviation Organization’s Aviation Security Panel, as well
as participating in and appearing before both American commissions and other national
government committees (Wallis, 1993, 2003; Wilkinson & Jenkins, 1999).
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